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                   Abstract:  
We  conduct  an  experiment  to  study  the  prevalence  of  the  higher  order  risk  attitudes  of 
prudence and temperance, in a large demographically representative sample, as well as in a 
sample of undergraduate students. Participants make pairwise choices between lotteries of the 
form proposed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). The choices in these lotteries isolate 
prudent from imprudent, and temperate from intemperate, behavior. We relate individuals’ 
risk aversion, prudence, and temperance levels to demographics and financial decisions. We 
observe that the majority of individuals’ decisions are consistent with risk aversion, prudence, 
and  temperance,  in  both  the  student  and  the  demographically  representative  sample.  An 
individual’s level of prudence is predictive of his wealth, saving, and borrowing behavior 
outside of the experiment, while temperance predicts the riskiness of portfolio choices. Our 
findings suggest that the coefficient of relative prudence for a representative individual is 





KEYWORDS: prudence, temperance, saving, portfolio choice, experiment 
JEL CODES:  C91, C93, D14, D81, E21 
 
 
                                                 
* Correspondence to Charles Noussair, Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE 




1.  Introduction 
The analysis of the effect of risk attitudes on economic decisions has typically focused on the 
impact of risk aversion. Under expected utility, this amounts to an assessment of the impact of 
the second derivative of the utility function. However, many decisions also depend crucially 
on higher order risk attitudes. For example, changes in precautionary saving due to changes 
in the distribution of a future income stream are determined by individuals’ prudence and 
temperance (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 2008; Kimball 1990; 1992; Leland 1968; Sandmo 
1970). In the classical utility framework, prudence is equivalent to a positive third derivative 
of the utility function (convex marginal utility), and temperance is equivalent to a negative 
fourth  derivative  (concavity  of  the  second  derivative).  The  degree  of  prudence  and 
temperance  that  individuals  exhibit  has  implications  in  a  wide  range  of  economic 
applications, including bargaining (White 2008), bidding in auctions (Eso and White 2004), 
rent seeking (Treich 2009), sustainable development (Gollier 2011), tax compliance (Alm 
1988; Snow and Warren 2005) and the valuation of medical treatments (Bleichrodt et al. 
2003).
1  
  In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to measure the extent to 
which a demographically representative sample, as well as a sample of university students,  
exhibits prudence and temperance. The data we have available about our participants allow us 
to consider how measures of prudence and temperance correlate with demographic variables, 
and with wealth and financial decisions outside of the experiment. We measure the correlation 
between risk aversion, prudence, and temperance among individuals, and provide estimates of 
prudence and temperance parameters for the constant relative risk aversion and expo -power 
utility specifications. We also conduct  a direct test of whether, conditional on the expected 
utility hypothesis and constant relative risk aversion, relative risk aversion is greater than one 
and relative prudence is greater than two. These are critical thresholds in the comparative 
static results of a number of applications (Eeckhoudt et al. 2010;  Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 
2008; Gollier 2001; Meyer and Meyer 2005; White 2008).    
  We use risk apportionment tasks to classify individuals by prudence and temperance. The 
tasks we employ, and the definition s of  prudence and temperance we adopt, are   due to 
                                                 
1 Prudence and temperance govern the response of individuals to changes in risk. For a prudent individual, the 
expected marginal utility of wealth increases if his income becomes riskier, since his marginal utility is convex 
in wealth. This means that, in response to an increase in income risk, he saves more. More generally, in these 
applications,  prudence  and  temperance  determine  the  optimal  tradeoff  between  high  risk  options  (uncertain 
future consumption, acquiring a good with an uncertain value, future uncertain wage offer) and low risk options 




Eeckhoudt  and  Schlesinger  (2006).  They  construct  simple  lottery  choices,  in  which  the 
decisions  taken  distinguish  between  prudent  and  imprudent,  and  between  temperate  and 
intemperate, individuals. A prudent individual has a preference for adding an unavoidable 
zero-mean risk to a state in which income is high, rather than adding it to a state in which 
income is low. Temperate individuals have a preference for disaggregating two independent 
zero-mean  risks  across  different  states,  rather  than  aggregating  them  in  a  single  state.  
  Under  expected  utility,  classifying  agents  as  prudent  and  temperate  based  on  risk 
apportionment decisions is equivalent to doing so based on signs of the derivatives of their 
utility functions.
2 An expected utility maximizer makes a prudent risk apportionment decision 
if and only if he has convex marginal utility (u''' > 0, where u''' is the third derivative of the 
utility function). Similarly, temperate risk apportionment decisions always coincide with 
those of an  individual with a concave second derivative of the utility function (u '''' < 0). 
However,  a  risk  apportionment  decision  that  classifies  an  individual  as  prudent  (resp. 
temperate) does not imply  that the individual is an  expected utility maximizer with u''' > 0 
(resp. u'''' < 0). Thus, an advantage of the use of risk  apportionment tasks is that they retain 
their ability to classify individuals by prudence and temperance   in a manner we view as 
intuitive, even if the expected utility hypothesis is violated (see e.g. Starmer 2000).
3     
                                                 
2 Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) show this equivalence in the following manner. Let x denote wealth, ε1 be a 
mean zero risk, and w1(x) be the utility premium (the change in expected utility from taking on a lottery with 
mean zero) for an expected utility maximizer. Then w1(x) ≡ Eu(x + ε1) – u(x), and, by Jensen’s inequality, w1(x) 
≤ 0 iff u''(x) ≤ 0.That is, the utility premium is negative for a risk averse individual. Differentiating both sides 
yields w1'(x) ≡ Eu'(x + ε1) – u'(x). It follows, again by Jensen’s inequality, that w1'(x) ≥ 0, iff u'''(x) ≥ 0. Thus, the 
utility premium is increasing in x, if and only if the individual is prudent. In other words, a prudent expected 
utility maximizer prefers to take on an unavoidable risk in a relatively high income state. 
  To show that a temperate individual prefers to disaggregate two risks, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) 
argue that u'''' < 0 is equivalent to concavity of the utility premium in income, and that concavity of the utility 
premium is equivalent to a preference for disaggregation of risks. Taking the second derivative of the utility 
premium yields w1''(x) ≡ Eu''(x + ε1) – u''(x). By Jensen’s inequality, w1''(x) ≤ 0, iff u'''' ≤  0. Now suppose that a 
temperate individual (one who has u'''' ≤ 0) faces an additional risk ε2, and let w2(x) ≡ Ew1(x + ε2) – w1(x). w2(x) 
is the expected change in the utility premium from taking on the second risk. Note that w2(x) ≤ 0, since w1(x) is 
concave. Substituting, it follows that w2(x) ≡ Eu(x + ε1 + ε2) - Eu(x + ε2) - Eu(x + ε1) + u(x) ≤ 0. Rearranging 
terms, we obtain .5Eu(x + ε2) + .5Eu(x + ε1) ≥ .5Eu(x + ε1 + ε2) + .5u(x). In other words, an individual prefers a 
lottery disaggregating the risks to one aggregating the risks, iff the individual is temperate. 
3 An analogous, model-free, concept of risk aversion has been proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), who 
relate risk aversion to a distaste for mean preserving spreads . To take the simplest example, u nder expected 
utility, an individual with a concave utility function (u '' < 0) prefers a certain outcome over a lottery with the  
same expected value. A preference for the certain outcome over the lottery, however, can be used to classify a 
decision  maker as risk averse, irrespective of  whether  he is an expected utility  maximizer, and indeed, 
irrespective of the decision model he uses. The classification is intuitive as it corresponds to distaste for risk. 
Similarly, if the decision maker must accept a risk, and he prefers to have it when his income is relatively high, 
he is prudent. If he must accept a risk at a certain level of income, and he prefers to do so wh en he has no other 




  The  use  of  experimental  methods  allows  direct  measurement  of  prudence  and 
temperance.  Empirical  estimates  of  relative  prudence  coefficients  for  representative 
individuals from a population vary widely, from insignificantly different from zero to levels 
greater than five (Dynan 1993; Eisenhauer 2000; Ventura and Eisenhauer 2006). Similarly, 
estimates of the fraction of saving that is precautionary also differ greatly, ranging from close 
to zero to 60 percent (Browning and Lusardi 1996; Lusardi 1998; Carroll and Kimball 2008; 
Dardanoni  1991;  Guiso  et  al.  1992;  Carroll  and  Samwick  1998;  Ventura  and  Eisenhauer 
2006). The evidence with regard to prudence from these studies is indirect, however, because 
it is inferred from saving, consumption, and investment behavior, and the level of prudence 
cannot  be  easily  distinguished  from  other  variables.  Selection  biases  may  also  arise  in 
empirical  studies  if  prudence  is  not  elicited  directly.  For  example,  measurements  of 
precautionary savings are biased downward if prudent individuals select into occupations with 
low income risk (Dynan 1993; Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln 2005; Guiso and Paiella, 
2008).  Furthermore,  virtually  all  empirical  studies  assume  a  specific  utility  framework. 
Widely used utility functions, such as the constant absolute (CARA) and the constant relative 
(CRRA)  risk  aversion  families,  exhibit  both  prudence  and  temperance  by  definition. 
Consequently, estimates that are based on such parametric forms presuppose the prevalence 
of these attitudes. These utility functions also imply restrictions on the relationship between 
risk aversion and higher order risk attitudes.
4 In light of these methodological issues and the 
diversity of the conclusions of empirical studies, Carroll and Kimball (2008) argue that direct 
measurement of prudence and temperance are required to obtain accurate estimates of their 
incidence in the population.  
  Experimental methods, which can elicit such direct measures, have been applied to 
measure higher order risk attitudes with the undergraduate student populations typically 
employed in experimental research. Tarazona-Gomez (2003) measures prudence using a price 
list format,  in which certainty equivalents are elicited for various lotteries. She reports a 
modest  incidence  of  prudence,  with  fewer  than  half  of  the  students  in  her  sample 
unambiguously categorized as being prudent. Ebert and Wiesen (2009) study the relationship 
between prudence, skewness preference, and risk aversion. They find that a majority of their 
subjects are prudent. Deck and Schlesinger (2010) measure both prudence and temperance. 
                                                 
4 For example, for the CARA utility function, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion equals that of absolute 
prudence and absolute temperance. For CRRA, the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 1 minus that of 




They  present  subjects  with  decision  problems  constructed  with  the  decision-model-free 
definitions of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), as we do here. Deck and Schlesinger (2010) 
find modest overall degrees of prudence and intemperance in their sample. Meier and Ruger 
(2010) find that a majority of individuals are prudent and temperate in both the gain and loss 
domains, and that risk aversion, prudence, and temperance are positively correlated. Ebert and 
Wiesen (2010), using a price list format to provide measures of prudence and temperance, 
also classify a majority of their subjects as risk averse, prudent and temperate. They also 
observe that prudence is more pervasive than temperance, and that risk aversion, prudence 
and temperance are positively correlated.   
  The use of a demographically representative sample allows us to consider whether the 
results of these prior experimental studies generalize to broader populations. Furthermore, the 
availability  of  extensive  background  data  for  our  participants  allows  us  to  assess  the 
relationship between prudence and temperance, and other variables. In particular, we are able 
to associate decisions in the experiment with demographic variables and with wealth, saving, 
and  investment  decisions.  However,  to  generate  a  more  straightforward  comparison  with 
previous experimental studies, we also conduct our experiment with 109 university student 
subjects in a laboratory setting similar to those employed in prior studies.  
  We find pervasive prudence in both the general population and the sample of university 
students, with the latter being even more prudent. A majority of decisions in both samples are 
temperate, but temperance is less widespread than prudence. Risk aversion, prudence, and 
temperance are positively correlated, and the most risk-seeking individuals are also imprudent 
and intemperate on average. Women are more risk averse and more temperate than men. 
Temperance is weaker when the risks involved are smaller. University students and more 
highly  educated  individuals  are  more  prudent.  Prudent  decisions  in  the  experiment  are 
associated with greater wealth, a greater likelihood of having a savings account, and a lower 
likelihood of having credit card debt. Temperance is associated with less risky investment 
portfolios. Risk aversion exhibits no relationship with the financial status variables we have 
available.  
  While the elicitation method is model-free, we use our data to fit widely-used utility 
functions, and to provide estimates for the coefficients of relative risk aversion, prudence and 
temperance,  under  expected  utility.  Browning  and  Lusardi  (1996,  p.1808)  emphasize  the 
importance  of  such  calibrations  to  restrict  the  precautionary  saving  model  empirically, 




relative risk aversion coefficient between .89 and 1.43, and a coefficient of relative prudence 
between 1.68 and 2.24, depending on the data and the specification of the utility function 
employed.   
  In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  the  theoretical  foundations  of  our  elicitation  method. 
Section 3 describes the experimental design, the subject pool, and the background data we 
use.  We  then  introduce  the  four  treatment  conditions  that  constitute  our  experiment.  The 
treatments vary the strength of the financial incentives and the size of the risks. In two of our 
treatments choices are incentivized, while the other two have hypothetical incentives. Because 
most consumer surveys do not elicit incentivized choices (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997; Dohmen et 
al. 2010), the extent to which decisions involving hypothetical and real payoffs yield similar 
estimates is of interest. In section 4, we present the results regarding the prevalence of the risk 
attitudes, their correlation with each other, and the differences between treatments. Section 5 
studies  the  relationship  between  our  elicited  experimental  measures  and  wealth/financial 
profiles of participants. Section 6 reports the results of the parametric utility estimation, and 
section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background and Elicitation Method 
Within the classical utility framework, prudence and temperance are properties of the third 
and  fourth  derivatives  of  the  utility  function,  respectively.  In  particular,  prudence  is 
equivalent to a convex marginal utility function, and temperance is equivalent to a concave 
second derivative of the utility function. Let X be a risky lottery, and x=E[X] be its expected 
value. Let u be a utility function. Then the condition E[u(X)]<u(x) implies concavity of u and 
risk  aversion.  The  condition  E[u'(X)]>  u'(x)  is  equivalent  to  convexity  of  u'  and  thus  to 
prudence.
5 The condition E[u''(X)]< u''(x) defines concavity of u''(x) and temperance. The two 
concepts of prudence and temperance can be defined locally or globally, and as weak versions 
which only require weak, rather than strict, inequalities. 
  Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) relate these higher order risk concepts to observable 
preferences in an analogous manner to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1 970), who define risk 
aversion as distaste for mean preserving spreads. Eeckhoudt and Schle singer (2006) define 
prudence and temperance in terms of principles of risk apportionment. Let x, y, k, z 1, and z2 
be strictly positive monetary outcomes, and let y = x – k. Assume that realizations x and y, as 
                                                 
5  This  condition  is  equivalent  to  the  presence  of  demand  for  precautionary  saving  in  an  intertemporal 




well as +z1 and –z1, are equally likely, and that the chance outcomes are all independent 
within, and between, lotteries L and R.







Figure 1: Risk Apportionment Task Identifying Prudence  
 
  In lottery L, a zero-mean risk, in which the individual can gain or lose z 1, occurs in the 
high wealth state. Lottery R is identical, except that the zero-mean risk occurs in the low 
wealth state.  An individual who is prudent prefers lottery L over lottery R, while one who is 
imprudent prefers R to L. Intuitively, given wealth level x, the decision maker has to confront 
two harms, a sure reduction in wealth by an amount k, and the addition of a zero-mean lottery 
risk of size z1. A prudent decision maker has a preference for disaggregating these two harms. 
Accepting the risk in the state of high wealth x is preferred over accepting it in the state of 
low wealth y.  
  The condition  for temperance is  shown in  Figure 2. As in  the case of prudence, the 
decision maker has the choice between aggregating (lottery R) or disaggregating (lottery L) 
two harms. The harms are two zero mean lotteries of sizes z1 and z2, both of which have 







Figure 2: Risk Apportionment Task Identifying Temperance  
                                                 
6 Under Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger’s (2006) definition, the zero-mean risks are not restricted to be symmetric. 
Ebert and Wiesen (2009) show that asymmetry of the additional risks affects the higher order properties of the 
lotteries. In the current study we always use symmetric risks.  
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A  temperate  individual  prefers  lottery  L,  and  an  intemperate  one  prefers  lottery  R.  A 
temperate decision maker thus has a preference for disaggregation of the two risks.
7 
  We present our subjects with choices of the form described in Figures 1 and 2. To test 
two conditions regarding the strength of relative risk aversion and relative prudence under 
expected utility, we also include two additional choice problems.  Eeckhoudt et al. (2010) 
provide conditions on lottery choices that, under expected utility, test whether the  coefficient 
of  relative  risk  aversion,  RR(x)  =  –xu''(x)/u'(x),  is  greater  than  one;  and  whether  the 
coefficient of relative prudence, RP(x) = –xu'''(x)/u''(x), is greater than 2. Intuitively, in one of 
these tasks, the choice of the safer lottery is discouraged by a lower expected value. In the 
other task, the choice of the prudent lottery is discouraged by a greater variance. That is, to 
justify a choice of the safer, and the more prudent, lottery in these situations, the decision 
maker must have sufficiently strong risk aversion, and prudence, respectively. Analogously to 
the relative coefficients defined above, we can define the coefficient of relative temperance, 
RT(x) = –xu''''(x)/u'''(x) (Kimball 1990; 1992), as well as absolute coefficients The coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion, AR(x) = –u''(x)/u'(x), the coefficient of absolute prudence, AP(x) = 
–u'''(x)/u''(x), and the coefficient of absolute temperance, AT(x) = –u''''(x)/u'''(x). The actual 
choices subjects faced are described in the next section.  
 
3.  Experimental Design, Subject Pools and Background Data 
3.1. Subject Pools and Background Data 
In total, 3566 subjects participated in the experiment. 3457 subjects were members of the 
LISS panel, an internet panel managed by CentERdata, an organization affiliated with Tilburg 
University.  The  LISS  panel  consists  of  approximately  9000  individuals,  who  complete  a 
questionnaire  over  the  internet  each  month.  Respondents  are  reimbursed  for  the  costs  of 
completing the questionnaires four times a year. This payment infrastructure allowed us to 
provide incentivized monetary payments to participants.  
  The  LISS  panel  is  a  representative  sample,  in  terms  of  observable  background 
characteristics, of the Dutch population. The random subsample invited to participate in the 
experiment was stratified to reflect the population. A large number of demographic variables 
are available for the LISS panel participants. In addition, we have extensive self-reported data 
                                                 
7 If a person is subject to the disposition effect, and is aware of it, it would make him more likely to make an 
imprudent decision. If the first lottery yields a relatively low outcome of y, the player would like to have a 




on  their  financial  situation.  Because  of  the  close  relationship  between  prudence  and 
temperance, and precautionary savings, wealth, and portfolio choice, we relate the financial 
data to the level of prudence and temperance that we measure.  
  In  addition,  we  also  conducted  the  experiment  at  the  CentER  laboratory,  located  at 
Tilburg University, with undergraduate student participants. A total of 109 student subjects 
participated in the experiment. For the student sample, we have the background variables of 
age, gender, nationality, program of study, and the results of Frederick’s (2005) cognitive 
reflection test that was included in the experimental session to measure the cognitive ability of 
students, available.  
 
3.2. Experimental Design and Treatments 
Subjects were presented with a total of 17 binary choices between lotteries. The 17 decisions 
were grouped in four parts, with part one consisting of five choices between a sure payoff and 
a risky lottery to evaluate a participant’s degree of risk aversion. Part two consisted of five 
choices that tested for prudence, of the form shown in Figure 1. Part three comprised five 
choices testing for temperance, of the form shown in Figure 2. Part four was two choices 
testing for the two conditions on relative risk aversion and relative prudence under expected 
utility, described at the end of section two. Part one always came first and part four was 
always last. Parts two and three were counterbalanced.  
  A list of all choices is given in Table 1. For purposes of exposition, in Table 1 and the 
rest of the paper, we use the following notation to describe the lotteries. Let [x_y] denote a 
lottery that yields outcome x or outcome y, with equal probability. Then, compound lottery L 
in Figure 1 can be written as [(x+[z1_–z1])_y]. Similarly, compound lottery R in Figure 2 can 
be written as [x_(x+[ z2_–z2] +[ z1_–z1])].  
  Subjects  were  presented  with  one  choice  at  a  time.  The  five  choices  measuring  risk 
aversion were ordered, such that the certain payoff increased monotonically (or decreased in 
counterbalanced conditions). The five choices for prudence and temperance varied in terms of 
(1) the initial endowment (or wealth level) x, (2) the reduced wealth level y (for prudence), 
and (3) the size of the risks z1 and z2. This variation allows us to study the effect of changes in 
endowment and risk magnitude. No lotteries were resolved before the end of the session. No 
indifference option was provided, i.e. subjects always had to choose one of the lotteries. The 
presentation of the lotteries with respect to the position on the left or the right sides of the 





Table 1: List of Choice Situations 
  Left lottery  Right lottery 
Riskav 1  20  [65_5] 
Riskav 2  25  [65_5] 
Riskav 3  30  [65_5] 
Riskav 4  35  [65_5] 
Riskav 5  40  [65_5] 
Prud 1  [(90+[20_-20])_60]  [90_(60+[20_-20])] 
Prud 2  [(90+[10_-10])_60]  [90_(60+[10_-10])] 
Prud 3  [(90+[40_-40])_60]  [90_(60+[40_-40])] 
Prud 4  [(135+[30_-30])_90]  [135_(90+[30_-30])] 
Prud 5  [(65+[20_-20])_35]  [65_(35+[20_-20])] 
Temp 1  [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[30_-30])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[30_-30])] 
Temp 2  [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[10_-10])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[10_-10])] 
Temp 3   [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[50_-50])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[50_-50])] 
Temp 4  [(30+[10_-10])_(30 +[10_-10])]   [30_(30+[10_-10] +[10_-10])] 
Temp 5  [(70+[30_-30])_(70 +[30_-30])]   [70_(70+[30_-30] +[30_-30])] 
Ra_EU1  [40_30]  [50_24] 
Prud_EU2  [(50+[25_-25])_30]  [50_(30+[15_-15])] 
Notes: [x_y] indicates an equiprobable lottery to receive either x or y; choice of the left lottery indicates risk 
aversion, prudence, and temperance, respectively. 
 
  All risks involved in the experiment were equiprobable lotteries, and all randomizations 
were conducted by the computer.  For interpretation of the compound lotteries in terms of 
prudence and temperance, it is crucial to emphasize the independence of the multiple risks. 
We therefore presented  the lotteries to  subjects graphically by means  of three differently 
colored  dice,  as  shown  in  Figure  3,  with  the  understanding  that  each  die  represented  a 
computerized equal probability draw. Figure 3 is an example of the display participants saw 
for  the  most  complex  decision  type  in  the  experiment,  that  for  temperance.  An  English 






Figure 3: Graphical Presentation of Choice Situations 
   
  There were four different treatment conditions, as summarized in Table 2. Each subject 
participated in only one treatment. In the Real and Real-lowvar treatments, each individual 
had a 1 in 10 chance of being randomly selected to receive a real monetary payment. If an 
individual was selected, one of her 17 decisions was randomly chosen to count toward her 
earnings. The expected payoff, conditional on an individual being selected, was roughly €70, 
and  the  actual  payoff  ranged  from  €10  to  €150.
8  Real-lowvar  was  identical  to  the  Real 
treatment, except that the risk z1 was 1/10th as great in Real-lowvar. The background risk z2 in 
the temperance decisions was identical in the two treatments. The Real-lowvar treatment was 
inspired by a remark of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), who speculate that individuals 
might be more likely to aggregate risks than to disaggregate them, if one of the risks is very 
small. In all treatments, zero or negative earnings were impossible. 
Table 2: Treatments 
  N  Stakes  Risk z1 
Real  1054+109  1/10 chance of EV = €70   10 to   50  
Hypo  1066  Hypothetical EV = €70   10 to   50 
Hypo-highpay  995  Hypothetical EV = €10500   1500 to   7500 
Real-lowvar  342  1/10 chance of EV = €70   1 to   5  
 
  We also included two hypothetical treatment conditions with different payoff scales. The 
hypothetical nature was made clear to participants at the beginning of the experiment. The 
                                                 
8 Combining large payoffs with a random selection of participants for real payment is often done in large-scale 
studies with the general public (e.g., von Gaudecker et al. 2010). In a study of risk attitudes, the procedure 
leverages  incentives,  and  avoids  the  potential  problem  of  relatively  linear  utility  for  small  payoffs  (see 
Abdellaoui et al. (2010) and references therein). Abdellaoui et al. (2010) show that random selection leads to 
stronger incentives than a downscaled payoff scheme, where all subjects are paid with certainty. Starmer and 
Sugden (1991) provide evidence that selecting one decision for payment, rather than all decisions, does not 




Hypo treatment was identical to the Real treatment, except for the fact that no choices counted 
toward participant earnings. This allows us to test whether decisions are biased when they are 
not incentivized. 
  The Hypo-highpay treatment was identical to the Hypo treatment, except for the fact that 
payoffs  were  scaled  up  by  a  factor  of  150.  The  factor  was  chosen  so  that  the  baseline 
endowment in 6 out of 10 prudence and temperance decisions, which was €90 in the other 
three treatments but €13,500 in Hypo-highpay, approximated the median annual net income 
of all panel members of €12,960. The framing in this treatment involved a range of payoffs 
that would have significant influence on individuals’ wealth positions, comparable to a major 
financial shock such as temporary unemployment or uncovered medical expenses. 
  All four conditions were conducted with members of the LISS panel. The sample sizes 
for the different treatments are shown in Table 2.
9 All of the undergraduate students in the 
laboratory were assigned to the Real treatment. The student participants faced exactl y the 
same procedures and choices as the subjects in the LISS panel, including the 1 in 10 chance of 
having one of their decisions count toward earnings. In contrast to the panel, students also 
received  a  €5  participation  fee.  General  instructions  were  given  at  the  beginning  of  the 
experiment, and specific instructions for each part were given immediately before the part 
began.  Participants  from  the  LISS  panel  received  the  instructions  on  their  screen  (see 
Appendix  A).  At  any  time,  they  could  click  on  a  link  to  go  back  to  any  point  in  the 
instructions  for  the  current  part  of  experiment.  Students  in  the  laboratory  received  the 
instructions on printed handouts. The laboratory sessions all took less than half an hour. 
 
4.  Prevalence of Prudence, Temperance, and Risk Aversion, and their Demographic 
Correlates 
We first measure the incidence of prudence, temperance, and risk aversion in our sample, and 
then consider factors that correlate with these risk attitudes. We measure an individual’s risk 
aversion as the number of safe choices he made, out of the five decisions involving a sure 
payoff and a risky lottery (decisions 1 – 5 in Table 1). As another measure of risk aversion, 
we  calculate  the  certainty  equivalent  (CE)  of  the  risky  lottery  resulting  from  these  five 
                                                 
9 Of the 3457 participants, a total of 31 people dropped out of the experiment at some point. Over all treatments, 
this reduces sample sizes by 3 for the risk aversion task, by 27 for the prudence task, by 23 for the temperance 





10  We measure  prudence  as  the  number  of  prudent  choices  in  the  five  choice 
situations  of  the  form  shown  in  Figure  1  (decisions  6  –  10  of  Table  1).  We  measure 
temperance  as  the number of temperate  choices  in  the five choice situations  of the form 
illustrated in Figure 2 (decisions 11 – 15 of Table 1). Table B1 in Appendix B gives the 
percentages of trials, in which each response was chosen, for each of the 17 questions.      
 
Table 3: Prevalence of Risk Aversion, Prudence and Temperance 












Risk aversion, i 
 




24.93*  24.18    25.85   25.99   22.65°   Included in 
Real 
Prudence, i  
 
3.45*  4.45 ª   3.39   3.43   3.47   3.34  
Temperance, i 
 
3.00*  3.12   3.02   2.96   3.12°  2.67ª  
RA_EU>1, iii 
 




.61*  .83ª   .59   .62   .66  Included in 
Real 
Note: Condition Real-lowvar identical to Real, except for prudence and temperance tasks. Real includes 
LISS panel participants only. Entries are i) the number of risk averse, prudent or temperate choices in five 
decisions, ii) the certainty equivalent in €, normalized by dividing by 150 for Hypo-highpay, and iii) the 
fraction of subjects choosing risk averse or prudent; *significantly different from random choice (i.e. 2.50 
for risk aversion, prudence and temperance decisions (rows 1, 3, and 4), .50 in RA_EU and Prud_EU (rows 
5 and 6) or risk neutrality with CE=€35.00 (row 2), at the 1% significance level, Wilcoxon test. ª indicates 
Real-lowvar or the university student sample significantly different from Real treatment, Mann-Whitney 
test; °indicates Hypo-highpay significantly different from Hypo treatment, at 5% significance level, Mann-
Whitney test; CE(65_5) excludes subjects who violated monotonicity.  
 
  The prevalence of risk aversion, prudence, and temperance. Table 3 presents results for 
the  whole  sample,  as  well  as  separately  for  each  treatment  and  for  the  students  in  the 
laboratory.  In  each  treatment,  a  significant  majority  of  decisions  are  consistent  with  risk 
aversion, prudence and temperance. The only exception is for temperance in the Real-lowvar 
treatment.  Risk  aversion  is  also  indicated  in  the  average  certainty  equivalent,  which  is 
                                                 
10 The certainty equivalent is defined here as the midpoint between the largest certain amount, for which the 
lottery was chosen, and the smallest certain amount for which the safe option was chosen. While the number of 
safe choices made can be calculated for all subjects, the certainty equivalent can only be calculated for subjects 
who behaved monotonically with respect to the safe option, and switched only once between the certain amount 




significantly lower than the expected value of the lottery of €35 in all treatments. Prudence is 
more prevalent  than temperance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,  p<.01).
11  Figure 4 provides 
more details about the distribution of choices. Strong risk aversion, prudence and temperance, 
with all five choices consistent with the attitude, is the modal outcome. Nevertheless, a 
considerable fraction of subjects choose intemperately in all five decisions. The next -to-last 
row of Table 3 indicates that the median relative risk aversion coefficient is exactly equal to 1 
(50% chose the alternative consistent with a coefficient greater than one, and 50% did not). 
The last row of the table indicates that the coefficient of relative prudence is greater than two 
for a majority of individuals.  
< sideways Figure 4 about here > 
  Columns 2 to 6 of Table 3 show the results for each treatment separately. We find 
treatment effects. Risk aversion is stronger in the Hypo -highpay treatment than in the Hypo 
treatment. This is indicated in the number of risk averse choices shown in row 1, the certainty 
equivalents given in row 2, and the responses to the task evaluating relative risk aversion in 
row 5. This is suggestive of increasing relative risk aversion. Prudence is stronger among the 
university students in the laboratory than among respondents in the LISS panel.  Temperance 
is stronger in the Hypo-highpay than in the Hypo treatment. It is also less pervasive in the 
Real-lowvar than in the Real treatment,  providing an affirmative answer to Eeckhoudt and 
Schlesinger’s (2006) intuition that decision makers might be more likely to aggregate risks 
when one of the risks is small. There are no significant differences between the Real and the 
Hypo treatments for any of the measures. This suggests that non-incentivized choices provide 
unbiased estimates of the average attitudes of a population for similar real stakes. 
 
  Correlation between risk aversion, prudence, and temperance. An important empirical 
question concerns the correlation of risk aversion with higher order attitudes (e.g., Browning 
and Lusardi 1996, section 5.3). If the most prudent agents are also the most risk averse, they 
would select into jobs with low income risk. This is the case, for example, for the German 
civil servants discussed by Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln (2005). Consequently, they do 
not have a strong need for precautionary saving compared to less prudent agents in riskier 
occupations. Such self-selection makes the empirical identification of precautionary motives 
                                                 
11 All tests in this paper are two-sided tests. There were some effects of counterbalancing the order and the 
presentation  of  the  choices.  Because  counterbalancing  always  involved  equally  sized  groups,  we  report 




difficult.  While  Fuchs-Schuendeln  and  Schuendeln  (2005)  used  the  natural  experiment  of 
German reunification to identify such self-selection, we can study the relationship between 
risk aversion, prudence, and temperance directly.   
 
Table 4: Rank Correlation Among Attitudes 
  All Participants  Laboratory   LISS Panel 
  Risk 
aversion 
Prudence  Risk 
aversion 
Prudence  Risk 
aversion 
Prudence 
Prudence  .251***    -.039    .256***   
Temperance  .320***  .362***  .367***  .180*  .319***  .366*** 
Note: Spearman rank correlation coefficients reported; */*** denotes significance at the 10%/1% 
level. 
 
  Table 4 shows that there is substantial positive correlation among the three measures in 
the LISS sample. Students in the laboratory exhibit similar patterns, except that they show no 
correlation  between  risk  aversion  and  prudence.  Table  5  provides  more  detail.  Each  row 
contains the average number of prudent and temperate choices of individuals based on the 
number of safe choices they made in the risk elicitation tasks. On average,  the most risk 
seeking  subjects  are  both  imprudent  and  intemperate,  while  risk  averse  subjects  are  both 
prudent and temperate. Both higher order attitudes increase monotonically with the level of 
risk  aversion,  though  temperance  is  only  significant  for  relatively  strong  levels  of  risk 
aversion. These results,  indicating a strong correlation  between risk attitudes, support the 
view  that  self-selection  is  an  important  factor  to  consider  in  empirical  measurements  of 
precautionary savings. 
Table 5: Prudence & Temperance by Number of Risk Averse Choices 
 





0 (n=317, risk seeking)   2.27** (imprudent)  1.73***(intemperate) 
1 (n=228, risk neutral/risk seeking)  3.01***  2.34 
2 (n=513, risk neutral/risk averse)  3.24***  2.59 
3 (n=604, risk averse)  3.36***  2.81*** 
4 (n=468, risk averse)  3.55***  3.14*** 
5 (n=1409, risk averse)  3.87***  3.57*** 
Notes: **/*** denotes significance at the 5% /1% level, Wilcoxon test of the null hypotheses of 
random choice (prudence = temperance = 2.5) 




  Prudence,  temperance,  and  the  risk/endowment  ratio.  We  next  consider  whether  the 
likelihood of making a prudent or a temperate decision depends on the endowment to risk 
ratio of the decision task. For each prospect, we calculate the ratio of the zero-mean risk z1 
that has to be allocated (e.g.,  €20, z1=20), to the expected value of the prospect (e.g., €75 for 
a prospect [90_60], thus Ratio=26.7%). The ratio is then included in a random effects probit 
regression where the dependent variable is a choice in favor of the prudent or temperate 
alternative,  and  each  individual  decision  is  the  unit  of  observation.  We  conduct  separate 
regressions for prudence and for temperance, each using the five available choices per subject. 
For temperance, we also control for the size of the zero-mean background risk z2 (e.g., €30 for 
the prospect [90_(90+[30_-30] +[10_-10])], with Ratio=10/90=11%), which does not affect 
the ratio. In an additional specification we include controls for gender and age, and treatment 
dummies.
12   
  We find a strong effect of the risk-to-endowment ratio on the temperance measure, with 
an approximately 0.16 percentage point (p.p.) increase per percentage point increase in the 
ratio (z>4.58, p<0.01). To illustrate, consider an increase in the ratio by 22 percentage points 
e.g. by going from [90_(90+[30_ -30] +[10_-10])] to [90_(90+[30_-30] +[30_-30])]. This 
increases the preference for the respective temperate alternatives,  [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[10_-
10])]  and [(90+[30_ -30])_(90 +[30_-30])], by 3.5 p.ps. This effect remains robust if we 
control for the size of the background risk (regression IId), or for treatments and background 
variables (regression IIb). The effect of the risk -to-endowment ratio is consistent with the 
relationship between the Real-lowvar treatment and temperance shown in Table 3. Indeed,  
comparison of regressions IIc and IIb shows that the effect of the Real -lowvar treatment 
disappears if the ratio is included.    
   
                                                 
12 The Real-lowvar treatment has very small ratios, of between 1.33% and 5.33% for prudence, and between 
1.11% and 5.55% for temperance. For the other treatments, this variation lies between 13.33% and 53.33%, and 
11.11% and 55.55%, respectively. Thus, when controlling for treatment, the coefficient on Real_lowvar reflects 






Table 6: Effect of Risk-to-Endowment Ratio on Prudent and Temperate Choices 
  Ia  Ib  IIa  IIb  IIc  IId 









































   -1.711 
(.68) 


















  16.385 
(11.76)*** 







  0.663  
(.22) 







  1.412  
(.69) 







  2.367  
(1.15) 




    
N (subjects)  3539  3539  3545  3545  3545  3545 
N (obs)  17695  17695  17717  17717  17717  17717 
Notes: Random effects (panel) probit regressions; Five observations per subject; Ratio= absolute size of risk that 
has to be allocated divided by the expected value of the prospect; background risk=absolute size of the zero-
mean risk z2 in temperance; marginal effects reported in percentage points; z-statistics in parenthesis; */**/*** 
denotes 10%  / 5% / 1% significance level;  
 
  For the prudence measure, there is an approximately 0.05 p.p. increase per percentage 
point increase in the ratio (z>1.83, p<0.067). Here, increasing the risk-to-endowment ratio by 
27  p.ps.  with  a  change  from  [90_(60+[10_-10])]  to  [90_(60+[30_-30])],  increases  the 
preference  for  the  respective  prudent  alternatives,  [(90+[10_-10])_60]  and  [(90+[30_-
30])_60], by 1.35 p.ps. Overall, these relationships are consistent with decreasing absolute 
prudence and temperance, with stronger effects for temperance. These findings are consistent 
with the evidence for decreasing absolute prudence found by Tarazona-Gomez (2003) and 





  Demographics. We now consider the influences of demographic characteristics on the 
indices for risk aversion, prudence and temperance. The demographic variables were selected 
on the basis of previous literature. We include all of the controls used in Fuchs-Schündeln and 
Schündeln’s (2005) study of precautionary saving, as well as health status and a dummy for 
higher  education  (college).  The  latter  two  variables  have  strong  influence  on  wealth 
accumulation, and are related to income uncertainty and risk preference (Guiso et al. 1996; 
Lusardi 1998, 2008; Viscusi and Evans 1990; Zeckhauser 1970). Although the dependent 
variables are in a discrete form and are censored at 0 and 5, we report OLS estimates here for 
ease of interpretation of the coefficients, and because fewer distributional assumptions are 
required. Table 7 shows the results. A random effects model, where each decision problem 
has  a  random  effect,  as  well  as  ordered  probit  and  tobit  regressions,  yield  qualitatively 
identical results. 
  We find that women are more risk averse than men, which is consistent with previous 
research (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009). Older people are less risk 
averse, but become so at a decreasing rate as they age. The hypothetical treatment with scaled 
up  payoffs  elicits  greater  risk  aversion,  which  is  consistent  with  increasing  relative  risk 
aversion (Holt and Laury 2002). Students in the laboratory are more prudent than others, and 
higher education is correlated with greater prudence. No gender effect exists for prudence, but 
the age effects are jointly significant (p<.01 in regression IIa and p<.05 in regression IIb), 
indicating a reduction in prudence with age. Females are more temperate. The Real-lowvar 
treatment leads to significant reductions in temperance. For all three attitude measures, the 
explained variance is low, suggesting that idiosyncratic features are of greater importance 
than demographics (Malmedier and Nagel 2010).  
 
< Table 7 about here > 
 
  We also conducted a regression analysis for the student sample separately (not reported in 
the table), including Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reflection test measuring cognitive ability, 
and  whether  the  student  was  a  Dutch  national  or  a  foreign  student.  Nationality  had  no 
influence  on  any  of  the  attitudes.  Higher  scores  on  the  cognitive  reflection  test  were 
associated  with  greater  prudence  (t=2.40,  p<0.05),  but  had  no  effect  on  risk  aversion  or 
temperance. This finding supports the view that prudence is particularly pervasive among 





5.  Implications for Savings and Portfolio Choice 
In  principle,  higher  order  risk  attitudes  influence,  through  their  effect  on  precautionary 
motives, how much people save and how they allocate their savings among different asset 
classes. Several studies have tried to evaluate the empirical importance of the precautionary 
saving motive by regressing a measure of income risk on wealth holdings or wealth changes 
(Browning and Lusardi 1996; Carroll and Kimball 2008). The lack of a reliable measure of 
income  risk,  and  the  potential  self-selection  into  occupations  with  different  income  risk, 
however,  complicate  the  identification  of  precautionary  motives  (Lusardi  1997). 
Consequently, the literature has given a wide range of estimates of the degree of prudence and 
the  fraction  of  saving  that  is  precautionary.  Our  direct  measurement  of  higher  order  risk 
attitudes, and the availability of wealth and saving data  for our participants, allows us to 
approach  this  question  with  a  different  strategy.  Instead  of  testing  whether  increased 
uncertainty leads to higher savings, implying prudence, we directly test whether our revealed 
preference measures of risk attitudes predict savings. If differences in income risk and other 
determinants of saving are sufficiently controlled for, the variation in the level of prudence 
and temperance would correlate with the variation in savings.
13 Similarly, higher order risk 
attitudes would correlate with the share of risky assets that people hold (Gollier 2001; Guiso, 
Jappelli, and Terlizzese 2006). Under decreasing absolute risk aversion (i.e., strong prudence 
and temperance), people would reduce their exposure to risky assets in the presence of greater 
background risk.     
  In this section, we evaluate the predictive power of our experimental measures of higher 
order risk attitudes, for saving and investment behavior outside the experiment . We conduct 
three different analyses. First, we consider the correlations between our measures and binary 
dependent variables that indicate whether or not individuals have savings, investments and 
credit card debt. These variables are presumably measured with little error. Second, we relate 
our measures to indices of participants’ wealth, which are similar to those typically used in 
studies of precautionary saving and wealth. While these continuous wealth measures have 
more variation across households, they naturally involve more measurement error than simple 
                                                 
13 While this effect immediately follows for prudence, the impact of temperance relates to more specific changes 
in the risk profile an individual faces (Eeckhoudt and Schesinger 2008) and would therefore be harder to detect. 
Because we cannot control for self-selection of agents into occupations with low income risk, our estimates are 




binary responses. Third, we correlate our measures to an index of the share of participants’ 
portfolios that is allocated to risky investments.  
 
5.1. Prudence, Temperance and the Presence of Savings, Investments, and Debt 
We consider how risk attitudes relate to specific components of saving and wealth. We have 
data on whether or not each subject in the LISS panel has any (1) savings accounts or savings 
certificates, (2) risky investments, (3) real estate investment, (4) long-term insurance,
14 (5) 
loans or revolving credit arrangements, and (6) an unpaid credit card balance. We conduct 
probit regressions for each of these variables on the risk measures, including two different 
sets of control variables. The first set, Controls A, consists of the exogenous variables o f 
gender, age and treatment, as in the regressions of type (a) in Table 7. The second set, 
Controls B, includes several variables that may affect the propensity to save. These variables 
are listed in the (b) regressions of Table 7.  
  Table  8  shows  the  esti mates  for  savings  and  credit  card  debt,  using  different 
specifications. The models are estimated for the entire sample of participants, and for the 
subsamples consisting of (i) those who indicated that they made their household’s financial 
decisions,  and  (ii)  those  who  reported  relatively  high  income  uncertainty.
15  These  two 
subsamples presumably exhibit more variation in saving behavior and wealth accumulation, 
and thus perhaps greater opportunity for the effect of prudence and temperance on saving and 
wealth to be detected.  We find that prudence increases the likelihood that a participant has a 
savings account or certificate, and it reduces the likelihood that he has unpaid balances on a 
credit card. The former effect is very robust, while the latter effect is reduced if we include the 
large set of controls or restrict the sample to those people who report high income uncertainty. 
Females are less likely, and  home owners, high income  individuals,  and highly educated 
respondents are more likely, to have sav ings accounts (not shown in the table). Older and 
                                                 
14 In the Netherlands, many households have insurance contracts which, in the event of the death of the policy 
holder, pay off a mortgage he holds and provide a payment to his heirs, and also have the feature that they pay 
off  a  different  sum  if  the  policyholder  is  living  when  he  reaches  retirement  age.  Our  variable  ―long-term 
insurance‖ indicates the value of such policies, which roughly correspond to life insurance, mortgage insurance, 
and 401K/IRA retirement savings accounts in the United States. 
15 The LISS panel data includes a question regarding the change in the financial situation of the participant over 
the last 12 months. Possible responses could range from ―much worse‖, to ―no change‖, to ―much better.‖ The 
high  income  uncertainty  sample  excludes  subjects  who  indicate  no  change.  The  individuals  who  made  the 




higher income subjects are more likely, and home owners are less likely, to have a negative 
credit card balance.
16 
< sideways Table 8 about here > 
 
  Temperance reduces the likelihood of risky investments, as  shown in the left portion of 
Table 9,  in  regressions 1–4.  This  effect  is  reduced  for  self-reported  household  financial 
decision makers, but is particularly strong for people facing high income uncertainty. Females 
are less likely, and older subjects, home owners, and highly educated subjects are more likely, 
to have risky investments. There is no robust effect of any of the three risk attitude measures 
on life insurance, real estate and loans. Perhaps surprisingly, risk aversion does not predict 
any of the financial variables for which we have data. As can be seen in the bottom three lines 
of both tables 8 and 9, if the regressions are conducted using each measure separately while 
excluding the two others, the results are similar. 
 
< sideways Table 9 about here > 
 
5.2. Prudence, Temperance and Precautionary Wealth 
To consider the relationship between risk attitudes and wealth, we construct the following 
measure of wealth from quantitative information on assets and liabilities:  
 
wealth = savings balance + long term insurance balance + risky investments +       (1) 
real estate investments – mortgage liabilities – other loans. 
 
We also consider a second wealth measure, which excludes long-term insurance, real estate, 
and mortgages. Thus, we exclude housing related assets and liabilities, and focus on the most 
liquid components of wealth. We run OLS regressions of log wealth on our three risk attitude 
measures, in conjunction with the two different sets of control variables. Table 10 shows the 
results.  
                                                 
16  As  indicated  earlier,  risk  aversion,  prudence,  and  temperance  are  positively  correlated.  This  raises  the 
possibility of multicollinearity in the regressions reported in tables 8, 9, and 10, where all three attitudes are 
included in the set of covariates. In all of the regressions reported, however, both the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) and the condition numbers are well below conservative thresholds of 5 for VIF and 15 for condition 
number. This indicates that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our regression analyses. The tables also 
report results from regressions including each attitude alone, while excluding the two others from the estimated 




< sideways Table 10 about here > 
 
  The table contains the coefficients of our three risk attitude measures on log wealth. Risk 
aversion and temperance do not affect wealth in our sample, while prudence is associated 
with greater wealth. The effect of prudence varies between an 11% and a 25% increase in 
wealth per prudent choice in the experiment, depending on the specification. The effect is 
robust with respect to the wealth measure used, and also appears with similar force if we 
restrict the sample to those who report to be the main financial decision maker of a household, 
or to those who face high income uncertainty. For both wealth measures, inclusion of the full 
set of controls reduces the effect of prudence. The effect for financial decision makers is less 
pronounced than for the whole sample, and becomes insignificant if we include the full set of 
controls. The largest effects are observed for those participants who report significant income 
uncertainty. 
  Overall, the results give clear evidence that prudence is correlated with greater wealth. 
The regressions also reveal relationships between demographics and wealth (not shown in the 
table). Females and married people have lower wealth, while higher income, more highly 
educated, and home owning respondents hold more wealth. The effect of higher education 
also explains the reduction of significance if we include Controls B; education is strongly 
correlated with prudence as shown in Table 7. Similar results are obtained if each measure is 
included  in  the  regressions  separately  while  excluding  the  two  others.  The  effect  of 
temperance  remains  insignificant,  while  risk  aversion  becomes  significant  in  some 
specifications. The effect of prudence is reinforced, becoming both economically greater and 
estimated with greater precision.  
 
5.3. Prudence, Temperance and Portfolio Choice 
To construct a measure of the share of a participant’s portfolio that is composed of risky 
assets, we divide his total holdings of risky assets by the sum of his total holdings of risky 
assets plus his savings. Risky assets consist of holdings of growth funds, share funds, bonds, 
debentures, stocks, options and warrants. These are presumably the most liquid and flexible 
components of portfolio wealth, and are also  relatively unlikely to be affected by factors 
unrelated to the riskiness of the holding. Because 83% of the participants hold no risky assets, 




in  which  risky  portfolio  share  is  the  dependent  variable,  we  use  a  Tobit  regression 
specification.  
  The regressions show that temperance is related to less exposure to risky assets. This is 
consistent with the finding reported in subsection 5.2, that temperance reduces the likelihood 
that people hold investments. The effect on portfolio shares becomes stronger, if the complete 
set of controls is included, or if we restrict the sample to the self-reported household financial 
decision  makers.  The  strongest  reduction  in  risky  portfolio  share  per  temperate  choice  is 
obtained for people who report high income uncertainty. Females hold less risky portfolios, 
and older, more highly educated and home owning subjects hold more risky portfolios.       
 
6.  Parametric Analysis  
Most  microeconomic  level  empirical  studies  of  saving  and  portfolio  decisions  rely  on  a 
parametric expected utility framework. In this section we provide estimates of the coefficients 
of risk aversion, prudence, and temperance, for the widely used constant relative risk aversion 
and expo-power utility functions, under the assumption of expected utility. The CRRA family 
has  sometimes  been  criticized  because  the  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  relative  risk 
aversion increases with wealth (Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Holt and Laury 2002). Our results 
support this view (see also Table 7 Ia and Ib, effect of the Hypo-highpay treatment). The 
expo-power  family  has  been  proposed  as  an  alternative  specification  that  combines  the 
desirable features of decreasing absolute and increasing relative risk aversion. We estimate 
the two parameter specification employed by Holt and Laury (2002).  
  All 17 decisions that the subjects made are used to fit a maximum likelihood model of the 
CRRA and the expo-power utility functions. We estimate the models for pooled data from the 
Real, Real-lowvar and Hypo treatments together, as well as separately for the Hypo-highpay 
treatment, which had greater nominal payoffs. For the CRRA utility function, u(x) = x
1–ρ(1–
ρ)
–1, the coefficients of relative risk aversion, prudence and temperance are given by ρ, ρ + 1, 
and ρ + 2, respectively. For the expo-power utility function, u(x) = (1–exp(– x
1–r))
–1 , the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equals RR(x) = r +  (1 – r) x
1–r. The expressions for the 
relative prudence and temperance coefficients are more complex, and we give closed forms, 
as well as the details of the estimation method and statistical tests, in Appendix C. For expo-
power utility, all three coefficients depend on wealth. We evaluate the coefficients at the 
expected payoff over all choices. Thus, for the Real, Real-lowvar, and Hypo treatments, x is 




are  positive,  the  utility  function  exhibits  decreasing  absolute  and  increasing  relative  risk 
aversion (IRRA). The estimation results are given in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Parametric Estimates of Relative Risk Aversion, Relative Prudence and Relative 
Temperance under Expected Utility 
  CRRA  Expo-power 
Payoff size  Normal  High  Normal 
(  = .097; r = .484) 
High 
(  = .089;  r= .652) 
Risk aversion  0.89  0.94  0.93  1.43 
Prudence  1.89  1.94  1.68  2.24 
Temperance  2.89  2.94  2.58  3.13 
Note: Estimates for expo-power utility evaluated at x=€70 for the normal payoff size treatments (Real, 
Real-lovar, and Hypo), and x=€10500 for the treatment with high payoffs (Hypo-highpay). 
 
  The estimates for the CRRA model indicate significant risk aversion for both payoff 
magnitudes, with coefficients of .89 and .94. The estimates are in the range typically observed 
in direct measurements with lottery choices (Guiso and Paiella 2008, Harrison et al. 2007). 
The coefficient  for the  Hypo-highpay treatment  is  significantly  greater  than for the other 
treatments, suggesting increasing relative risk aversion. The estimation of the expo-power 
function results in significantly positive parameters   and r, and thus also indicates increasing 
relative risk aversion.
17 Relative risk aversion is greater than one for this functional form for 
the high payoff condition, but smaller than one for the other three treatments. Note that for 
expo-power utility the  difference between the coefficients of relative risk aversion and 
prudence (and temperance) is less than one (than two).  
  In section four, we reported that the direct test of RR( x)>1 and RP(x)>2 proposed by 
Eeckhoudt et al. (2010) lends support only to the latter condition. This pattern, a coefficient of 
relative  prudence  exceeding  that  of  relative  risk  aversion  by  a  value  greater  than  1,  is 
inconsistent with both the CRRA, and the expo-power, functional forms. The data in Table 10 
illustrate the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to whether a representative or a median 
individual is considered, and to the estimation methodology and assumptions. To model risk 
aversion and higher order attitudes more flexibly under expected utility, in order to account 
for the observed pattern, a different utility function might be more appropriate. Alternatively, 
we may allow for deviations from expected utility. Deck and Schlesinger (2010, section five) 
                                                 
17 Holt and Laury (2002) also report DARA and IRRA ( =.029; r=.269), while Harrison et al. (2007) do not 




and Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2005) discuss non-expected utility models that allow for more 
complex patterns of higher order risk attitudes. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In  this  study,  we  have  measured  prudence  and  temperance  directly  in  a  demographically 
representative sample of the Dutch population, and in a sample of undergraduate students. 
Prudence is widespread and positively correlated with financial well-being, education, and 
cognitive ability. The decisions taken on our prudence tasks predict financial status. The more 
prudent  an  individual,  the  greater  is  his  wealth,  the  more  likely  he  is  to  have  a  savings 
account, and the less likely he is to have credit card debt. Thus, we find a clear link between 
prudence  and  saving,  as  in  the  precautionary  saving  model  (Kimball  1990).  Prudence  is 
correlated with educational attainment, and university students make more prudent choices 
than  the  overall  population.  Our  results  are  consistent  with  previous  studies  of  student 
populations that have found that a majority are prudent (Ebert and Wiesen 2009; 2010; Deck 
and  Schlesinger  2010).  Furthermore,  within  the  sample  of  university  students,  those  that 
perform better on a test of cognitive ability make more prudent choices. Prudence is not 
correlated with gender or age. 
  A majority of decisions are temperate, but temperance appears to be less pervasive than 
prudence. Temperance and prudence are positively correlated. Women are significantly more 
temperate then men are, and temperance is moderated when the risk involved is relatively 
small.  The  share  of  an  individual’s  portfolio  that  is  composed  of  risky  investments  is 
negatively correlated with his degree of temperance. The relationships are usually strongest 
for people reporting high income uncertainty, suggesting that background risk is an important 
influence on financial decisions (Eeckhoudt et al. 1996; Guiso and Paiella 2008).   
  We also find that the majority of individuals are risk averse, which is consistent with 
previous  studies  (see  for  example  Holt  and  Laury  2002,  or  Harrison  et  al.  2007).  Risk 
aversion  is  positively  correlated  with  prudence  and  temperance;  the  more  risk  averse  an 
individual, the more prudent and temperate she is likely to be. Risk aversion does not predict 
wealth  or  saving  behavior.  Women  are  more  risk  averse  than  men.  Individuals  exhibit 
increasing  relative, but  decreasing absolute,  risk aversion. The coefficient  of  relative risk 
aversion for a representative individual, for the stakes we study, is close to one. 
  We  make  two  observations  concerning  methodology.  The  first  is  that  hypothetical 




the  view  that  simple  hypothetical  questions  to  elicit  prudence  and  temperance  in  policy 
surveys are a valid option for obtaining unbiased estimates of the average responses that 
would  be  observed  under  real  monetary  incentives.  The  second  is  that  estimates  of  risk 
aversion  and  prudence  coefficients  depend  considerably  on  the  data  and  estimation 
methodology employed. For relative risk aversion, the estimates are in a close range for all 
methodologies.  The  median  coefficient  is  exactly  one  for  a  binary  decision  which  sorts 
individuals based on that threshold. Imposing functional forms on the utility function, and 
using multiple responses in the estimation, somewhat lowers the risk aversion estimate of the 
representative individual. For prudence, however, the estimates are more sensitive. While our 
binary choice to distinguish individuals with relative prudence of greater than two from those 
with less than two implies a median estimate greater than two, imposition of functional forms 
on the utility function gives mixed results, but with estimates close to two for a representative 
individual. 
  Our study shows that the methodology to measure higher order risk attitudes introduced 
by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) can readily be implemented in surveys with general 
populations. It yields direct measurements of preferences, which have some predictive power 
for financial status variables. While measurements of risk aversion have successfully been 
included in survey instruments (Barsky et al. 1997; Guiso and Paiella 2008), prudence and 
temperance  have  not.  Our  results  suggest  that  information  about  these  attitudes  can 
significantly  improve  predictions,  especially  if  combined  with  the  more  sophisticated 
measures of income uncertainty available in some surveys (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 
2005; Guiso et al. 1996; Nosic and Weber 2010). Explicitly accounting for heterogeneity in 
higher order risk attitudes may then help to solve some of the puzzles in the literature, such as 
the low saving rates for lower income classes (Hubbard et al. 1995), or the low consumption 
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Appendix [not intended for publication; will be made available online] 
 
Appendix A: Instructions for the LISS Panel participants for the Real treatment 
(translated from Dutch, the instructions for the other treatments and for the students 
differed only slightly from those given here) 
 
This questionnaire is about risk attitudes. Some people like to take risks while others prefer to avoid them. 
We ask you to make several choices between two options. Both options yield a prize, depending on rolls of 
six-sided dice performed by the computer. This questionnaire concerns your own preferences; there is no 
right or wrong answer.  
[following paragraph appeared in Real and Real-lowvar treatments only] 
There is a chance that you will be paid for real! At the end of the questionnaire, the computer will determine 
whether you will be paid for real. The chance that you will be paid for real is 1 in 10. If you are paid for real, 
the computer will randomly select one of the options you have chosen. The computer will then roll the dice 
to determine the prize from the option you have chosen. This prize will be transferred to your bank account.  
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer. The option that you choose could be the one that is randomly selected 
by the computer to be paid for real.  
 
Explanation of part 1 
In part 1, you choose between two options, called ―Option L‖ (left) and ―Option R‖ (right). An example of a 
choice is given below: 




As you see, in both options, a red die is rolled. In this example, ―Option L‖ yields €45 if the roll of the red 
die is 1, 2, or 3. If the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6, ―Option L‖ yields €15. In the example, ―Option R‖ 
yields €25, irrespective of the roll of the red die.  
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer; any option can be selected by the computer to be paid for real. Please 
make your choices between ―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖  
[5 risk averse questions] 
 
Explanation of part 2 
In addition to the red die, a white die will also sometimes be rolled in both options. An example of a choice 
is given below: 
[Example of a prudence choice] 
 
The white die is sometimes rolled 
As you see in the example, the white die is rolled if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6 in ―Option L,‖ while 
the white die is rolled if the roll of the red die is 1, 2, or 3 in ―Option R.‖  
 
The roll of the white die determines whether an amount will be added to, or subtracted from, the 
original prize resulting from the roll of the red die.  
In the example, if the roll of the white die is 1, 2, or 3, €15 is added to the prize resulting from the roll of the 
red die. If the roll of the white die is 4, 5, or 6, €15 is subtracted from this prize.  
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer. The option that you choose could be the one that is randomly selected 
by the computer to be paid for real. Please make your choices between ―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖  
[5 prudence questions] 
 
Explanation of part 3 
In addition to the red and the white die, a black die will also sometimes be rolled under both options. An 
example of a choice is given below: 
[Example of a temperance choice] 
 
The white and the black die are sometimes rolled 
As you see in the example, the white and the black die are rolled if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6 in 
―Option L‖. In ―Option R‖, the white die is rolled if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6, but the black die is 
rolled if the roll of the red die is 1, 2, or 3. 
 
The rolls of the white die and the black die determine whether an amount will be added to, or 




In the example, if the roll of the white die is 1, 2, or 3, €15 is added to the prize resulting from the roll of the 
red die. If the roll of the white die is 4, 5, or 6, €15 is subtracted from this prize.  
If the roll of the black die is 1, 2, or 3, €25 is added to the prize resulting from the roll of the red die in the 
example. If the roll of the black die is 4, 5, or 6, €25 is subtracted from this prize.  
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer. The option that you choose could be the one that is randomly selected 
by the computer to be paid for real. Please make your choices between ―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖  
[5 temperate choices] 
 
Explanation of part 4, question 1 of 2 
In the final part of this questionnaire, we ask you to make 2 additional choices between two options called, 
―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖ There is no example choice; please choose between the options depicted below:  
[choice RR_EU>1] 
As you see, in both choices a red die will be rolled.  
-  Option L yields €40, if the roll of the red die is 1, 2, or 3. 
-  Option L yields €30, if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6. 
-  Option R yields €50, if the roll of the red die is 1, 2, or 3. 
-  Option R yields €24, if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6. 
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer. The option that you choose could be the one that is randomly selected 
by the computer to be paid for real. Please make a choice between ―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖  
 
Explanation of part 4, question 2 of 2 
Finally, please make a choice between the options depicted below:  
[choice RP_EU>2] 
As you see, in both choices a red die will be rolled first. 
 
The white die is sometimes rolled 
As you see, the white die is rolled if the roll of the red die is 4, 5, or 6 in Option L, while the white die is 
rolled if the roll of the red die is 1, 2, or 3 in Option R.  
 
The roll of the white die determines whether an amount will be added to, or subtracted from, the 
original prize resulting from the roll of the red die.  
If the roll of the white die is 1, 2, or 3, €25 is added to the prize resulting from the roll of the red die in 
―Option L‖. In ―Option R‖, €15 is added. 
 




in ―Option L‖. In ―Option R‖, €25 is subtracted. 
 
You can earn money 
Always choose the option you prefer. The option that you choose could be the one that is randomly selected 
by the computer to be paid for real. Please make a choice between ―Option L‖ and ―Option R.‖  
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your participation.  




Appendix B:  Choice percentages for each decision problem 
 
Table B1: Raw Choice Proportions 
  Left prospect  Right prospect  % of instances in 
which left prospect 
is chosen
a 
      LISS 
Panel 
Students  
Riskav 1  20  [65_5]  49.6  42.2 
Riskav 2  25  [65_5]  58.1***  53.2 
Riskav 3  30  [65_5]  69.2***  79.8*** 
Riskav 4  35  [65_5]  78.2***  91.7*** 
Riskav 5  40  [65_5]  82.7***  92.7*** 
Prud 1  [(90+[20_-20])_60]  [90_(60+[20_-20])]  69.5***  89.0*** 
Prud 2  [(90+[10_-10])_60]  [90_(60+[10_-10])]  67.1***  88.1*** 
Prud 3  [(90+[40_-40])_60]  [90_(60+[40_-40])]  68.6***  91.7*** 
Prud 4  [(135+[30_-30])_90]  [135_(90+[30_-30])]  67.9***  87.2*** 
Prud 5  [(65+[20_-20])_35]  [65_(35+[20_-20])]  69.0***  89.0*** 
Temp 1  [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[30_-30])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[30_-30])]  59.3***  53.2 
Temp 2  [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[10_-10])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[10_-10])]  58.5***  56.0 
Temp 3   [(90+[30_-30])_(90 +[50_-50])]   [90_(90+[30_-30] +[50_-50])]  61.8***  69.7*** 
Temp 4  [(30+[10_-10])_(30 +[10_-10])]   [30_(30+[10_-10] +[10_-10])]  59.0***  65.1*** 
Temp 5  [(70+[30_-30])_(70 +[30_-30])]   [70_(70+[30_-30] +[30_-30])]  60.9***  67.9*** 
Ra_EU1  [40_30]  [50_24]  50.9  36.7*** 
Prud_EU2  [(50+[25_-25])_30]  [50_(30+[15_-15])]  61.0***  82.6*** 
Notes: [x_y] indicates a prospect with an equal probability of receiving either x or y; a: choice of left prospect 
indicates a safe choice, prudence, and temperance, respectively; *** indicates significant difference at 1% level 















Appendix C: Utility Estimation Procedures and Results 
C1. Closed Form Expressions  
 
This section contains the closed form expressions for the relative and absolute coefficients of 
risk aversion, prudence, and temperance, for the Constant Relative Risk Aversion and Expo-
Power utility functions, reported in section 6. 
   
Table C1: Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion, Prudence and Temperance 
  CRRA  Expo-power 
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Table C2: Coefficients of Absolute Risk Aversion, Prudence and Temperance 
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C2. Estimation Strategy and Statistical Tests 
 




prudence, and temperance for a representative individual, and gives some additional detail 
about the estimates. The estimates are reported and discussed in section 6. We used maximum 
likelihood estimation to maximize the probability of observing the responses. The conditional 
likelihood function is: 
 
max_{  or  , r} : lnL(  or  , r) = Σi [ln(θ(ΔEU)|yi = 1) + ln(1–θ(ΔEU)|yi = 0)],    
 
where  ΔEU  is  the  difference  in  expected  utility  between  the  two  lotteries  given  the 
parameter(s), θ(ΔEU) is a probit function translating ΔEU into a number between 0 and 1, and 
yi = 1 (0) denotes a choice of the left (right) lottery in decision task i. We allow for clustering 
at the individual level. The estimation is conducted for the pooled data from the Real, Real-
lowvar,  and  Hypo  treatments  (labelled  as  ―normal‖),  and  separately  for  Hypo-Highpay 
(labelled as ―high‖). The estimation results are given in Table C3. 
 
Table C3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results 
* (
+) denotes significantly different from 0 (1) at the 1% level, based on a Wald test. normal: treatments Real, 
Real_lowvar, and Hypo; high: treatment Hypo_highpay  
 
  For the CRRA specification, respondents are significantly risk averse in both the normal 
and high conditions, and respondents are significantly more risk averse in the Hypo-highpay 
treatment, compared to the other treatments. Coefficients of risk aversion are significantly 
smaller  than  1  in  both  cases.  The  estimation  of  the  expo-power  function  results  in 
significantly  positive  parameters    and  r,  indicating  increasing  relative  risk  aversion  and 
decreasing  absolute  risk  aversion.  The  coefficient  r  is  significantly  greater  in  the  Hypo-
highpay treatment than in the other treatments.  The coefficient   does not differ among the 
two subsets of the data. 
 







normal   0.890*
+  0.015  0.860  0.920  27633.94 
high  0.942*




+  0.010  0.463  0.504 
27550.80 
normal  0.097*
+  0.007  0.083  0.111 
rhigh  0.652*
+  0.008  0.636  0.668 
10695.47 
high  0.089*
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Table 7 
Table 7: Demographic Correlates of Prudence and Temperance  
  Ia  Ib  IIa  IIb  IIIa  IIIb 
  Risk aversion  Prudence    Temperance 




































Married  -  .062  
(.65) 
-  .073  
(.72) 
-  .144  
(1.34) 
Divorced  -  -.234  
(1.55) 
-  -.149 
(.93) 
-  .047  
(.29) 
# children  -  .023 
 (.70) 
-  .011  
(.31) 
-  .051 
 (1.33) 
Log gross income  -  -.022  
(1.44) 
-  -.025 
(1.49) 
-  .020 
(1.09) 
Home ownership  -  .056  
(.67) 
-  .054 
 (.63) 
-  -.036  
(.40) 
Health status (1= 
worst, 5 =best)  
-  -.072  
(1.61) 
-  .068 
(1.45) 
-  .008  
(.16) 
High education  -  .035  
(.47) 
-  .190 
(2.30)** 
-  -.138  
(1.57) 
Civil Servant  -  .100 
(1.28) 
-  .071  
(.57) 
-  .057  
(.41) 
Self-employed  -  -.185 
(1.05) 
-  -.100  
(.55) 
-  -.005 
(.03) 
Student  .189 
(1.35) 
-  .849 
(6.86)*** 
-  .145 
 (.82) 
-  




































N  3563  2427  3539  2413  3543  2416 
R
2  .045  .058  .018  .018  .010  .011 










Figure 4: Distribution of Individuals’ Safe (Risk Averse), Prudent, and Temperate Choices (all treatments, percentage of participants making 
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Table 8: Savings, credit card debt, and higher order risk attitudes 
  Presence of savings accounts     Presence of credit card debt    








  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Risk aversion  .304 (.58)  .111 (.21)  -.066 ( .11)  .398 (.61)  -.179 (.73)  .025 (.12)  -.527 (1.34)  -.144 (.41) 
Prudence  1.679  (3.55)***  1.291 (2.58)***   1.371 (2.65)***  1.911 (3.18)***  -.478 (2.20)**  -.362 (1.87)*  -.818 (2.38)**  -.367 (1.17) 
Temperance  -0.548 (1.13)  -.526 (1.06)   .033 (.06)  -1.052 (1.71)*  .159 (.68)  .076 (.38)  .269 (.72)  .271 (.81) 
Controls A  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls B  No   Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
N  2366  2158  1269  1462  2360  2153  1265  1457 
Pseudo R
2  .0209  .0502  .0169  .0229  .0562  .1005  .0525  .0449 
Risk aversion
a  .595 (1.22)  .340 (.67)  .419 (.76)  .548 (.90)  -.224 (1.00)  -.030 (.16)  -.624 (1.77)*  -.108 (.34) 
Prudence
a  1.544 (4.59)***  1.111 (2.16)**  1.340 (2.70)***  1.596 (2.86)***  -.459 (2.35)**  -.332 (1.90)*  -.848 (2.73)***  -302 (1.08) 
Temperance
a  .149 (.34)  -.014 (.03)  .469 (.95)  -.240 (.43)  -.041 (.20)  -.029 (.16)  -.158 (.48)  .125 (.43) 
Notes: probit regressions; marginal effects reported in percentage points; z-values based on robust s.e. in parenthesis; */**/*** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Self-reported main financial decision maker in household; High income uncertainty excludes participants 
who indicated that there was no change in their financial situation over the last year. a: coefficients from analogous regressions including each 







Table 9: Investment, portfolio choice, and higher order risk attitudes 
  Presence of risky 
investments (probit)  
  Portfolio share of risky 
investments (tobit)  
 








  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Risk aversion  .223 (.45)  .214 (.42)  .234 ( .30)  .639 (1.08)  -.011 (.51)  -.006 (.28)  -.003 (.15)  .031 (1.13) 
Prudence  .245  (.51)  -.155 (.31)   -.599 (.80)  .463 (.79)  .0003 (.01)  -.007 (.36)*  -.029 (1.39)  .009 (.33) 
Temperance  -1.123 (2.41)**  -.902 (1.88)*   -1.042 (1.42)  -1.742 (3.11)***  -.032 (1.76)*  -.038 (2.05)**  -.044 (2.20)**  -.061 (2.55)** 
Controls A  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls B  No   Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
N  2366  2158  1269  1462  1144  1078  673  709 
Pseudo R
2  .0539  .1047  .0435  .0717  .0815  .1142  .0826  .1160 
Risk aversion
a  -.173 (.38)  -.157 (.33)  -.475 (.68)  .124 (.22)  -.023 (1.15)  -.021 (1.03)  -.028 (1.30)  .016 (.61) 
Prudence
a  -.110 (.25)  -.433 (.94)  -.925 (1.37)  -.009 (.02)  -.012 (.63)  -.020 (1.09)  -.042 (2.09)**  -.005 (.19) 
Temperance
a  -.982 (2.36)**  .898 (2.08)**  -1.172 (1.81)*  1.414 (2.83)***  -.035 (2.00)**  -.041 (2.37)**  -.052 (2.79)***  -.053 (2.31)** 
Notes: probit regressions for presence of risky investments, marginal effects reported in percentage points; z-values based on robust s.e. in 
parenthesis; tobit regressions for portfolio share of risky investments, coefficients reported;   */**/*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level. Self-reported main financial decision maker in household; High income uncertainty excludes participants who indicated that there was no 
change in their financial situation over the last year.  a: coefficients from analogous regressions including each risk attitude measure alone and 









Table 10: Wealth and higher order risk attitudes 
  Log wealth    Log wealth (liquid)    








  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Risk aversion  .083 (1.19)  .063 (.87)  .106 (1.09)  .109 (1.26)  .057 (.84)  .033 (.46)  .106 (1.13)  .085 (1.01) 
Prudence  .198  (3.01)***  .118 (1.69)*  .176 (1.87)*  .25 (3.10)***  .184 (2.94)***  .117 (1.76)*  .167 (1.86) *  .241 (3.06)*** 
Temperance  -.037 (.59)  -.014 (.21)   .075 (.83)  -.123 (1.55)  -.055 (.91)  -.035 (.56)  .006 (.07)  -.141 (1.85)* 
Controls A  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls B  No   Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
N  2043  1854  1049  1247  2126  1929  1105  1296 
R
2  .0335  .0939  .0571  .0413  .0331  .0882  .0593  .0400 
Risk aversion
a  .127 (1.97)**  .097 (1.43)  .193 (2.16)**  .138 (1.72)*  .094 (1.50)  .057 (.86)  .160 (1.86)*  .114 (1.47) 
Prudence
a  .203 (3.37)***  .128 (2.00)**  .232 (2.69)***  .235 (3.10)***  .178 (3.06)***  .112 (1.82)*  .198 (2.40)**  .208 (2.85)*** 
Temperance
a  .049 (.85)  .041 (.70)  .165 (2.04)**  -.009 (.12)  .021 (.39)  .013 (.22)  .096 (1.24)  -.038 (.54) 
Notes: OLS regressions; t-values based on robust s.e. in parenthesis; */**/*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Self-reported main 
financial decision maker in household; High income uncertainty excludes participants who indicated that there was no change in their financial 
situation (in either direction) over the last year; parameters are growth rates; a: coefficients from analogous regressions including each risk 
attitude measure alone and excluding the two other measures. 